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Abstract
The probability that the frequency of a particular trait will eventually become
unity, the so-called fixation probability, is a central issue in the study of population
evolution. Its computation, once we are given a stochastic finite population model
without mutations and a (possibly frequency dependent) fitness function, is straight-
forward and it can be done in several ways. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the
fixation probability is an important macroscopic property of the population, its pre-
cise knowledge does not give any clear information about the interaction patterns
among individuals in the population. Here we address the inverse problem: From a
given fixation pattern and population size, we want to infer what is the game being
played by the population. This is done by first exploiting the framework developed
in FACC Chalub and MO Souza, J. Math. Biol. 75: 1735, 2017., which yields a
fitness function that realises this fixation pattern in the Wright-Fisher model. This
fitness function always exists, but it is not necessarily unique. Subsequently, we show
that any such fitness function can be approximated, with arbitrary precision, using
d-player game theory, provided d is large enough. The pay-off matrix that emerges
naturally from the approximating game will provide useful information about the
individual interaction structure that is not itself apparent in the fixation pattern.
We present extensive numerical support for our conclusions.
1 Introduction
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) was introduced in the earlier 70’s of the twentieth cen-
tury in the seminal work by Smith and Price (1973), as a convenient and useful tool to
describe animal interactions, where no rational behaviour can be assumed — in contradis-
tinction to its traditional application in economics. The first achievement of EGT was
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the derivation of mixed stable evolutionary states in infinite populations (Smith, 1982).
Subsequently, the replicator equation was introduced in evolutionary dynamics, using the
so called fitness, to model relative growth of biological populations (Taylor and Jonker,
1978). Assuming that individuals in a given population interact according to game theory,
their fitnesses were obtained from the pay-offs of the underlying games; see Hofbauer and
Sigmund (1998) and references therein.
On the other hand, the much older Wright-Fisher (WF) process was introduced in the
late 30’s as a model for the description of the evolution of gene frequencies in finite popula-
tions subdivided into finitely many different groups, homogeneous in all characteristics but
one under study (Fisher, 1922; Wright, 1938, 1937). One of the fundamental features of
the WF process, as considered here and in several other references (Ewens, 2004; Bu¨rger,
2000), is that it includes genetic drift, but not mutation. Hence, if the population reaches
a homogeneous state, i.e. a state with all individuals being of a single type, then it will
remain in this way forever— in Markov chain theory parlance these are termed absorbing
states (Taylor and Karlin, 1998).
Finite population processes with absorbing states share one important characteristic:
the dynamics will eventually reach an absorbing state. In the case of the WF process, this
means that the population will become homogeneous in the long run. This behaviour is
important when modelling situations in time scales that are faster than the mutational
one — so that one expects selection and genetic drift to have enough time to act. In
particular, the latter will be the ultimate cause for one type to fixate, i.e. to displace
all the other types before a new mutation takes place. In this framework, an important
question is the following: given the current state of the population, what is probability
that a certain type will fixate? This is considered one of the central questions in the
mathematical study of evolution. It is worth noting that, while there is no explicit formula
for the fixation probability of the finite population WF process (except for the so called
neutral evolution), its numerical determination can be easily done using finite Markov
chains and/or numerical linear algebra techniques (Taylor and Karlin, 1998).
Initial work with the WF process assumed constant fitnesses. This assumption has
been already relaxed, in the realm of mathematical population genetics, as early as in
(Ethier and Kurtz, 1986). However, it was just in the last decade that EGT and WF
processes were first combined as important modelling tools for studying the evolution of a
population (Imhof and Nowak, 2006).
Before moving on, we should point out that another important finite population process
is the Moran process. On one hand, following Hartle and Clark (2007), we define the
Darwinian fitness as the ratio of the expected number of individuals of a given type between
successive generations. On the other hand, in the classical definition of frequency dependent
Moran process, the probability to be selected for reproduction is assumed to be proportional
to the type fitness (Nowak, 2006). A simple calculation shows that these concepts are not,
in general, compatible, cf. Chalub and Souza (2017).
From now on, we will restrict ourselves to finite populations with two types, but we
will not make any a priori assumption about their interaction. Indeed, we will show that
almost any arbitrary interaction can be modelled by d-player game theory, provided we
2
do not impose any restriction on the game size. As already observed (Pacheco et al.,
2009; Souza et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2013; Pena et al., 2014; Chalub and Souza, 2016, 2017;
Czuppon and Gokhale, 2018; Chalub and Souza, 2018), d-player games with d ≥ 3 can
exhibit quite distinct behaviour from the 2-player ones. In the multi-type case, we expect
that a similar approach might work, but much remains to be done—indeed, multi-type
evolution is an important source of open mathematical problems.
Initially, as mentioned above, only 2-player game theory was used to describe the evo-
lution of a population in the non-constant fitness case, also called “frequency dependent
fitness”; in that case the fitness is an affine function with respect to the fraction of dif-
ferent individuals in the population; see, however, Kurokawa and Ihara (2009); Gokhale
and Traulsen (2010, 2014) for the recent use of d-player game theory in the description of
evolutionary processes.
The authors have been using arbitrary fitness functions, i.e. fitness functions not neces-
sarily derived from EGT, for almost a decade now when studying continuous approximations—
cf. Chalub and Souza (2009, 2014, 2016). However, it was only when studying finite
populations that the chasm became more evident. In Chalub and Souza (2017), it was
shown that fixation patterns of the WF process derived from 3-player game theory can be
fundamentally distinct from their 2-player game theory counterpart. In the latter frame-
work, fixation probability is always an increasing function of the initial presence, whereas
in the former, or in more general frameworks, this is not necessary the case. Non-increasing
fixation probabilities seem to be a topic not fully explored in the evolutionary dynamic lit-
erature; we however conjecture — at this point, without any experimental base – in Chalub
and Souza (2017) that this may be related to missing record fossils. In fact, if the fixation
probability is a non increasing function of the focal type initial presence, then an homoge-
neous state is more likely to be attained from a jump from a mixed state than trough a slow
process of accumulation. Finally, we point out that non monotonicity of fixation might
also appear in 2-player games, due to the stochastic fluctuations in population size — cf.
Huang et al. (2015) and Czuppon and Traulsen (2018), but without explicitly mentioning
it.
From a practical point of view, once the fitness functions are chosen the fixation prob-
ability is well determined and, indeed, it can be easily computed numerically. The present
work is devoted, however, to the inverse problem: to which extent does the fixation prob-
ability determine the fitnesses of all different types in the WF evolution, and how can the
fitnesses functions be reasonably approximated using d-player EGT, for d large enough.
A partial solution was presented in Chalub and Souza (2017), where it was shown that
any non-degenerated fixation probability vector can be obtained as the result of evolu-
tion by the WF process, with selection given by a certain discrete relative fitness function;
furthermore this relative fitness function is uniquely determined (modulo some trivial trans-
formations) if and only if the fixation probability vector is increasing as a function of the
initial presence of the focal type.
In the present work, we will go one step further and show that any fitness can be arbi-
trarily well approximated by pay-offs obtained from finite-player game theory. Therefore,
we will be able to show how any fixation pattern can be approximated using d-player game
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Figure 1: Direct (left) and inverse (right) problem in the WF dynamics. In the former case,
from an assumed interaction between individuals, we proceed step-by-step until finding the
fixation probability for all initial conditions. In the latter case, for a given d and fixation,
we find the d-player game that better approximates the given fixation.
theory. In particular, this shows, or at least indicates, the minimum number of individuals
required in each relevant interaction that are necessary to conveniently describe the long
run evolution of a WF population. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only work
where microscopic interactions among individuals in a population can be inferred from the
results of long term evolution, in particular, from the fixation probability. Fig. 1 summa-
rizes the direct problem in WF dynamics, and the inverse problem that is studied in this
work.
2 Fitness, fixation and the Wright-Fisher process
In this Section, we will review a number of definitions and results on the Wright-Fisher
(WF) process that will be relevant in the sequel. This review will follow closely Chalub
and Souza (2017) — in particular, we will consider WF processes for two types, A and
B, that are parametrised by type selection probabilities (TSP). More precisely, we will say
that the population is at state j, when there are j individuals of type A. We will write
M = (Mij)i,j=0,...,N for the process transition matrix — the probability to go from state j
to i — and p = (pi)i=0,...,N ∈ {0}× [0, 1]N−1×{1} for the vector of TSP — the probability
that an individual of type A is chosen for reproduction in a population with i individuals
of this type.
In this framework, we have that
Mij =
(
N
i
)
pij(1− pj)N−i .
Remark 1. We will follow the convention in Chalub and Souza (2017), and will index
vectors and matrices from 0 to N , unless otherwise stated. On the other hand, M as
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written above is column stochastic rather than being row stochastic as in Chalub and Souza
(2017).
Definition 1. A stochastic population process Xk is consistently parametrised if, and only
if, we have that
E[Xk+1|Xk = j] = Npj ∀k.
Remark 2. A process is consistently parametrised, if for any given population state, the
probability to select the focal type to reproduce at time t is equal to the expected fraction of
individuals of the focal type in the next generation. In particular
Φ(j) :=
E[Xk+1|Xk = j]/j
(N − E[Xk+1|Xk = j])/(N − j) =
N − j
j
pj
1− pj
is such that
pj =
jΦ(j)
jΦ(j) +N − j j = 1, . . . , N − 1
and therefore, Φ(j), the so called Darwinian fitness, is directly identified as a proxy to the
reproductive probability. As a consequence of Lemma 1 in Chalub and Souza (2017), we
conclude that the WF process is consistently parametrised.
Definition 2. We will say that F ∈ [0, 1]N+1 is an admissible vector of fixation probabil-
ities, if F ∈ {0} × (0, 1)N−1 × {1} ⊂ RN+1. Also, we will say that a vector a ∈ Rn is
strictly increasing (non-decreasing) if ai < ai+1 (ai ≤ ai+1, respec.) for i = 0, . . . , n − 1.
Finally, an admissible fixation vector will be termed: regular, if it is strictly increasing and
weakly-regular if it is non-decreasing. Otherwise, it will be termed non-regular.
Theorem 1. Every vector of fixation probabilities of a WF process is admissible. Con-
versely, given an admissible vector of fixation probabilities F, then there exists at least one
WF process, such that F is the associated fixation vector. In addition, if F is regular, then
this process is unique.
Remark 3. Definition 2 is a compacted version of Definitions 4 and 5 in Chalub and
Souza (2017), while the first part of Theorem 1 is contained in Proposition 1 and the second
part is Theorem 5 of Chalub and Souza (2017). WF processes with regular fixation were,
by extension, termed regular in Chalub and Souza (2017). Theorem 1 has an additional
consequence that is of interest: regular WF processes are uniquely characterised by their
fixation. In particular, all their transient properties are fully determined by their fixation
vector.
In what follows, we will need to recall the auxiliary results used to prove the second
part of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Let F be an admissible fixation vector, and consider
ΥF(p) =
N∑
i=0
Fi
(
N
i
)
pi(1− p)N−i . (1)
Then the following holds true:
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1. ΥF(0) = F0 = 0, ΥF(1) = FN = 1, and for p ∈ (0, 1), ΥF(p) ∈ (0, 1).
2. ΥF : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is continuous and onto.
3. If F is regular, then ΥF is an increasing function.
4. Let p be a TSP vector and consider the associated WF process that will denote by
M(p). Then F is the corresponding fixation probability vector if, and only if, we have
ΥF(pj) = Fj, j = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Remark 4. Lemma 1 is a collection of results that are somewhat scattered in Chalub and
Souza (2017). The first part of (1) and (2) are easily checked — admissibility comes into
play only in the second part of (1). (3) is a well-known property of Bernstein polynomials
— cf. Phillips (2003); Gzyl and Palacios (2003). (4) is the actual reason why ΥF is an
important object, and the easiest way to verify it is to check, from the definitions, that(
FTM(p)
)
j
= ΥF(pj).
3 The inverse problem for the fitness
3.1 The problem setup
In Section we will elaborate on the inversion of fixation into relative fitness, and provide
some additional results
Problem 1 (Inverse problem for fitness). Let us assume that we are either given a vector
of admissible fixation of probabilities F ∈ RN+1 or a fixation function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
satisfying(i) f(0) = 0; (ii) f(1) = 1; (iii) 0 < f(x) < 1, x ∈ (0, 1), together with a
population size N , such that Fj = f(j/N). The inverse problem for fitness is to find Φ(j),
j − 1, . . . , N − 1, such that, if we let
pj =
jΦ(j)
jΦ(j) +N − j , j = 1, . . . , N − 1,
then we have
FTM(p) = FT ,
where M(p) is the WF matrix for TSP p. In view of Theorem 1, Problem 1 always has
an exact solution. The next Lemma will be helpful when dealing with the inverse problem
in a more concrete way:
Lemma 2. For y ∈ [0, 1], let Υ−1F (y) = {x ∈ [0, 1] : ΥF(x) = y}. Let F′ ∈ [−1, 1]N be
defined by F ′i = Fi+1 − Fi, i = 0, . . . , N , and define sgn(F′) as the number of sign changes
in F′. Then, for all y ∈ [0, 1] we have that 1 ≤ #Υ−1F (y) ≤ 1 + sgn(F′). In particular, it
follows that we can always define the inverse map of ΥF as a set-valued map, and hence
we have
Φ(j) =
N − j
j
Υ−1F (Fj)
1−Υ−1F (Fj)
(2)
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Proof. The lower bound comes from the fact that ΥF is onto. The upper bound comes
from the fact that we can see ΥF as a two-dimensional Be´zier curve and F as its control
polygon. Hence, it satisfies the so-called total variation diminishing property (Lane and
Riesenfeld, 1983) and it must oscillate less than its control polygon. The number of zeros
of a function is bounded above by the number of oscillations plus one.
From a theoretical viewpoint, Equation 2 encodes all the information on the mapping
from fixation probabilities into relative fitnesses.
Definition 3. The critical set of ΥF is given by
Crit (ΥF) =
⋃
y : Υ′F(y)=0
Υ−1F (y).
Since ΥF is a polynomial, its critical set is always finite.
We are now ready to discuss the cases:
ΥF is increasing : In this case, Υ
−1
F is well defined and smooth, except over Crit (ΥF)
where it will be only continuous.
ΥF is not increasing : In this case, Υ
−1
F is defined only as set-valued function and further
work is necessary.
In order to deal with the non-monotonic case, we begin with a definition:
Definition 4. A branch of a set-valued function is a choice of a single element in each
of its set-values, such that Υ−1F is well defined and smooth, except over Crit (ΥF), where it
will have to be discontinuous at least over a point.
Remark 5. Branches are not unique, and we will single out two of them:
Υ−1,+F (y) = max Υ
−1
F (y),
with a similar definition using min for Υ−1,−F .
We now present a result on the stability of this recovering:
Lemma 3. Let Φ(j) be a solution for input Fj (or the solution, in the increasing case),
and let Φ(j) + ∆Φ(j) be the solution for input Fj + ∆Fj. Then
Υ′F (pj) (1− pj)2
j
N − j∆Φ(j) = ∆Fj, j = 1, . . . , N − 1. (3)
Proof. Let
pj + ∆pj =
j (Φ(j) + ∆Φ(j))
j (Φ(j) + ∆Φ(j)) +N − j .
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Then, we obtain that
∆pj =
j(N − j)
(N + j (Φ(j)− 1))2 ∆Φ(j) +O
(
(∆Φ(j))2
)
.
Similarly, from the identity
ΥF (pj + ∆pj) = Fj + ∆Fj, ΥF(pj) = Fj,
we obtain that
Υ′F (pj) ∆pj +O
(
(∆pj)
2) = ∆Fj
These two expressions yield, dropping higher order terms in ∆Φ(j), that
Υ′F (pj)
j(N − j)
(jΦ(j) +N − j)2 ∆Φ(j) = ∆Fj
Using the definition of Φ(j) in terms o pj we finally get Equation (3).
Remark 6. Equation 3 shows that, if Υ′F > α > 0, then
K =
(
α min
j=1,...,N−1
(1− pj)2 j
N − j
)−1
is an upper-bound on the amplification factor. Naturally, K can b very large if ΥF has a
plateau-like form, at least over some subinterval, which might lead to accuracy loss of the
inversion. It also shows that, when ΥF is non-monotonic, then the inversion might also
lose precision, which was already hinted by the non-continuity of the branches along the
critical set of ΥF.
3.2 Computational aspects
Increasing ΥF: In this case, Υ
−1
F is single valued, and hence Equation 2 is uniquely
defined as function of Fj. From a numerical viewpoint, we let Qj(p) = ΥF(p) − Fj and
solve it either using a good shelve root finder or using a more specific code. The former
should work in most cases, but might fail for fixation probabilities the have a plateau-like
behaviour — cf. Chalub and Souza (2016). The latter can be obtained by using a stable
numerical evaluation of ΥF by de Casteljeau’s algorithm together with a combination of
bisection and continuation methods — cf. (Press et al., 1992) and (Allgower and Georg,
2012).
Non-increasing ΥF: In this case, Equation (2) yields a set-valued map, and even if we
assume, for the time being, that we are able to approximate all set values accurately, we
are still left with the choice of elements in the set values that are not singletons. Here there
are two main avenues: (i) since Equation (2) is only to be enforced on a finite number of
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points, we can view it as a discrete problem and then consider some subset of all possible
combinations — e.g. taking the minimum or maximum from each set value; (ii) consider
it as continuous problem, and then choose a single-valued version (SVV) for Υ−1F that is
sufficiently regular. Indeed, since ΥF is locally invertible by the Inverse Function Theorem
outside its critical points, we can always restrict the discontinuities to the inverse images of
the critical points of ΥF, and obtain SVVs that are semicontinuous (either lower or upper).
It should be noticed that these approaches are not necessarily incompatible: for instance,
taking always the minimum or the maximum yields such regular SVVs — the former is
lower semicontinuous, while the latter is upper semicontinuous.
We now turn back our attention to the numerical approximation of the set values of
Υ−1F . In order to do this, we need to approximate all the roots for each Qj. For this task,
there are many algorithms that allow one to isolate the roots of a polynomial in a given
interval as the Vincent-Akritas-Strzebon´ski (VAS) method or Sturm sequences or Boudan-
Fourier theorem combined with the BN algorithm — cf. (Rouillier and Zimmermann, 2004;
Alesina and Galuzzi, 2000). Somewhat like in the previous case, these algorithms might
fail when working with fixation patterns that mix oscillatory-like with plateau-like regions.
In what follows, we will assume that Equation (2) has been inverted by a shelve nu-
merical method and hence that Φ(j) is available for j = 1, . . . , N − 1.
4 Games from given relative fitnesses vectors
Our aim now is to identify when a fitness recovered by the procedure described in the
previous Section can be explained by EGT.
4.1 Problem setup
Recall (Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010; Kurokawa and Ihara, 2009; Lessard, 2011) that in a
two-strategy, symmetric d-player game, each individual in a population of size N interacts
at once with d − 1 other individuals; if there are k type A individuals among the d − 1
opponents of the focal individual, then her pay-off is ak (if she is of type A) or bk (if she is
of type B). Therefore, a symmetric two-strategy d-player game is defined by two vectors
a(d),b(d) ∈ Rd.
Since every group of d interacting individuals is chosen at random from the entire
population, the average pay-off of type A and B individuals is given by the hyper-geometric
distribution. Thus, we have for j = 1, . . . , N − 1 that the average pay-off is
ϕA(j) =
d−1∑
k=0
(
j−1
k
)(
N−j
d−1−k
)(
N−1
d−1
) a(d)k and ϕB(j) = d−1∑
k=0
(
j
k
)(
N−j−1
d−1−k
)(
N−1
d−1
) b(d)k . (4)
we need to solve for the coefficients a(d) and b(d) the following N − 1 equations:
Φ(j) =
ϕA (j)
ϕB (j)
, j = 1, . . . , N − 1. (5)
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Before we proceed any further, we want to point out two issues:
1. If λ ∈ R, then the games defined by the pay-offs (a(d),b(d)) and (λa(d), λb(d)) are
associated to the same relative fitness given by Eq. (5) — hence, a particular solu-
tion can be identified with a line through the origin in R2d, and we cannot expect
uniqueness, unless some normalisation is chosen.
2. Unless d is sufficiently large, we cannot expect the system given in Equations (4)
and (5) to have solutions at all.
We will now elaborate on (2) above: Let Φ = (Φ(1), . . . ,Φ(N − 1))T , and A and B be
(N − 1)× d matrices defined by
Ajk =
(
j − 1
k
)(
N − j
d− 1− k
)
and Bjk =
(
j
k
)(
N − j − 1
d− 1− k
)
,
for j = 1, . . . , N − 1 and k = 0, . . . , d − 1. Also, let Let x = (a(d), b(d))T and let T be a
(N − 1)× (2d) matrix such that Tij = Aij for 0 ≤ j ≤ d− 1 and Tij = − (diag(Φ)B)i,j−d
for d ≤ j ≤ 2d− 1, where diag(v) is the diagonal matrix whose main diagonal is given by
v. Then, Equations (4) and (5) implies Tx = 0, with x 6= 0. Conversely, if x ∈ Null(T ),
and if A a(d) and B b(d) do not have null entries (in this case, the corresponding entry
vanishes for both of them), then the entries of x are a solution to Equations (4) and (5).
In particular, if d = N/2 (for even N) or if d = (N + 1)/2 (for odd N), then T must have a
non-trivial null space, and if the extra condition holds we have a solution.
From now on, we give-up on have an exact solution and pose the following problem
Problem 2 (Inverse problem for d-player games). Given a fitness vector Φ, and 2 ≤ d ∈ N,
find coefficients a(d) and b(d) that solve Equations (4) and (5) in least squares sense.
Problem 2 can be recast in two ways:
1. Let F (x) = A a(d)  B b(d), where  denotes Hadamard division. Then, the
corresponding non-linear least squares problem is given by
x∗ = (a(d)∗ , b
(d)
∗ )
T ∈ arg min ‖Φ− F (x)‖22.
2. Consider the matrix T defined above, and let T = UΣV ∗ be the SVD decomposition
of T , where U is (N − 1)× (N − 1), Σ is (N − 1)× (2d) and V is (2d)× (2d). Then,
a tentative solution is given by the last column of V — provided it satisfies the
additional condition.
The whole procedure is summarised in Fig. 1, noting that the map from fixation into
fitness may be multivalued – in this case, it is necessary to select a branch.
10
4.2 Acceptability of a given game
For a positive vector ω ∈ RN−1, and a vector x ∈ RN−1, the weighted L∞ norm is defined
by
‖x‖∞,ω = max
i=1,...,N−1
|xi|ωi.
For a given fixation F and population size N , we will deem the approximation F̂ produced
by the procedure above as a good approximation or (acceptable), if
‖F− F̂‖∞,ω ≤ N , (6)
where N is the maximum tolerable error when population size is N . The use of a weighted
norm allows to choose different thresholds for the different observed initial frequencies.
The choice of weight and tolerance constants are, to a large extent, arbitrary. In what
follows we will consider ω = 1, and N = 0.01. However, a second natural choice would be
to let ωi = (i/N (1− i/N))−1/2, and N = κ/√N, i.e., a maximum tolerable error proportional
to the natural fluctuations of the stochastic system.
Let us call AF the set of acceptable game sizes, i.e., if d ∈ AF , then there exists a
fixation produced by a d-player game, which is agood approximation. Note that, since
N ∈ AF , we have that AF 6= ∅ and that, if d ∈ AF , then d′ ∈ AF for all d′ > d.
Definition 5. Given a fixation vector F, we define its complexity as
dmin(F ) = min
d′∈AF
d′.
In other words, the fixation complexity is the minimum number of players necessary in a
typical micro-interaction to reproduce this fixation pattern of the Wright-Fisher dynamics,
with an error not greater than the error prescribed by Equation (6).
5 Examples
Let us consider a fixed population size N and assume that the fixation vector Fj, j =
1, . . . , N − 1, F0 = 1 − FN = 0, can be obtained from sampling a continuous function
f : [0, 1] → [0, 1], with f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1, on the grid of population frequencies.
Namely, we assume that Fj = f
(
j
N
)
. We will call f the fixation function.
We start by studying examples in which f is an increasing function in the interval [0, 1];
in this case the sequence (pi)i=0,...,N is uniquely determined and increasing.
In Figs. 2, 3, and 4 we study the three most relevant cases inherited from two-player
evolutionary game theory studies: dominance, coexistence and coordination, respectively.
However, we consider fixation functions f : [0, 1] → [0, 1], with f(0) = 1 − f(1) = 0,
that, despite the fact that they do not arise directly from 2-player game theory, are such
that their comparison to the neutral case as well as their concavity in the interval [0, 1]
make them directly comparable with the classical 2-player case, as described above. As
mentioned in Section 4.2, we will take ω = 1 and N = 0.01.
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Figure 2: Dominance case. Left: Fixation probability is obtained from f(x) = sin (pix/2).
The fixation vector is given by Fi = f(i/N) with i = 0, . . . , N , and a population of N = 100
individuals. The shadow represents the tolerable error, i.e, the region between f(x)±0.01.
The fixation probability for 2-player game with pay-off vectors a(2) ≈ (252, 0.959) and
b(2) ≈ (254, 2.16) is sobreposed to the fixation function and error bar (grey area). Right:
f(x) = 1 − √1− x, N = 100. We find that d = 2 provides a good approximation, with
a(2) ≈ (2.74,−0.00870) and b(2) ≈ (2.77, 0.0270), i.e., dmin = 2. In the former case, A
dominates B while the reverse occurs in the latter.
Figure 3: Coordination case, always with N = 100 individuals. Left: f(x) = (arctan(10x−
5) + arctan(5))/(2 arctan(5)). In this case, the approximation with d = 2 clearly fails to
provide a good approximation to the fixation probability. The first good approximation
is given by dmin = 3 with, a
(3) ≈ (4.95,−4.46, 5.23) and b(3) ≈ (5.25,−4.46, 4.93). Right:
f(x) = (erf(10x − 4) − erf(−4))/(erf(6) − erf(−4)) with erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−z
2
dz. The
first good approximation is given by dmin = 5, a
(5) ≈ (16.6, 13.3, 3.54,−0.217, 0.142) and
b(5) ≈ (25.5, 12.3, 2.01,−0.0532, 0.00235).
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Figure 4: Coexistence case, always with N = 100 individuals. Left: f(x) = 4
10
1−e20x
1−e20 +
6
10
1−e−10x
1−e−10 and N = 100. The first good approximation is given by dmin = 4, with a
(4) ≈
(1.30 × 103,−157,−59.0, 172) and b(4) ≈ (1.27 × 103,−131,−73.5, 182). Right: f(x) =
((x−9/20)5 +(9/20)5)/((115 +95)/205). The first good approximation is given by dmin = 4
and a(4) ≈ (0.799,−0.349,−0.230, 1.25) and b(4) ≈ (0.804,−0.366,−0.211, 1.24).
As discussed in Section 2, if f is strictly increasing then ΥF is monotonically increasing.
Nevertheless, even in this case we might have quite complex fixation patterns as showed in
(Chalub and Souza, 2016, 2018) and hence its numerical inversion may not be straightfor-
ward. However, if f ′(x) ≥ α = O(1), then the typical corresponding fitness patterns are
not too complex — thus, games with a small number of players will suffice. When f is no
longer increasing, or if f has plateau-like behaviour in some regions, then the numerical
inversion of ΥF is more involved. In addition, the fitness patterns are also typically more
complex, and thus we will need games with a larger number of players to fit the corre-
sponding fitness landscape. Fig. 5 shows that this might happen, even when there is a
slightly deviation from monotonicity.
6 Large population limits
In all simulations presented so far, we considered a population of N = 100 individuals.
Here, we will briefly discuss the relation between the minimum game dmin and the popula-
tion size.
On one hand, it is clear that we may design a WF process with pay-off given by d0-
player game, with d0 fixed irrespective of N . With the right set of assumptions for the
pay-off dependence on N , it is possible to obtain a diffusion approximation and, therefore,
a fixation probability. The inverse problem will then find a minimum game dmin ≤ d0,
depending on the tolerable error, i.e., to provide a simplification – an order reduction – of
the original game.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to design a family of games in which the order of
13
Figure 5: f(x) = (3.9)x(1/2 − x)(1 − x) + x (left) and f(x) = 4.1x(1/2 − x)(1 − x) + x
(right), with N = 100. Despite the fact that in the right case the fixation function is only
slightly decreasing in the interval x ∈ (0.455, 0.546), dmin = 7, while in the left case, where
f is increasing, implies that dmin = 4. Namely a
(4) ≈ (3.35,−1.13,−0.764, 3.05) and b(4) ≈
(3.42,−1.12,−0.775, 2.99) (left) and a(7) ≈ (1.21,−1.14, 1.10,−1.10, 1.14,−1.22, 1.35) and
b(7) ≈ (1.34,−1.21, 1.14,−1.10, 1.11,−1.15, 1.23) (right). Note that a small change in the
fixation function may change completely the game, in special if the function is not strictly
increasing any more.
the game depends on the population size. Namely, assume that the focal type has a large
probability to survive if and only if its presence is larger than a certain critical fraction of
the population. Assume that pi ≈ 0 for i < xcN and pi ≈ 1 for i > xcN , with xc ∈ (0, 1).
In other words, A and B collaborate with individuals of the same type, and in large groups.
If the fraction of A individuals is larger than xc, then A prevails, otherwise B prevails. The
fixation function will then be approximately given by θ(x − xc), where θ is the Heaviside
function. We expect that the minimum order of the game able to reproduce this fixation
probability will increase in N . However, from the computational point of view, the required
computing time seems to increase exponentially with d and, therefore, we are not able to
increase the order of the game arbitrarily.
These two examples show that, for certain fixation functions, it is natural to expect
dmin to increase as a function of N up to a certain bound, while for other fixation functions
dmin may increase without bound. Considering that real populations can be extremely
large, it is important to know a priori in which case we are.
At this point, we are far from providing any explanation in the behaviour of dmin when
N → ∞. We will, however, present some simulations that illustrate how the maximum
error between the original fixation probability Fi and the computed fixation probability
F˜i, for a given d, depends on N in Fig. 6.
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(a) f(x) = sin(pix/2) (b) f(x) = 1−√1− x
(c) f(x) = arctan(10x−5)+arctan(5)2 arctan(5) (d) f(x) =
4
10
1−e20x
1−e20 +
6
10
1−e−10x
1−e−10
(e) f(x) = 3.9x(1/2− x)(1− x) + x (f) f(x) = 4.1x(1/2− x)(1− x) + x
Figure 6: Dependence of E(d,N) = maxi |F˜i − Fi| on N for some values of d. For the
moment, we are not able to provide a general picture of the function E , however from
our numerical experiments, we notice that its dependence on N is small, albeit extremely
complicated, with the important exception of the case in which f is not monotonically
increasing (example (f)).
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7 Discussion
Fitness is one of the central concepts in the mathematical description of evolutionary
processes. Despite the fact that in most models, a class of simple fitness function (e.g.
constant or affine) is used, there are no a priori limitations on the functions that shall be
used when modelling real problems. However, a possible fitness function, obtained say,
from experiments, provides few, if any, insight in the dynamics between individuals in the
population under study.
The aim of this work is to provide a link between macroscopic observables (as the
fixation probability) and microscopic, first-principles, description of the population (finite
population models). Therefore, we show that any fixation pattern can be obtained as a
result of the Wright-Fisher process with explicitly calculated interaction between individu-
als. The more precision we want in the macroscopic description, the more complex will be
the game compatible with the data. However, an interesting insight in the internal modus
operandi of a population can be obtained from the game that is not evident in the fixation
pattern, or even in the fitness function.
In order to achieve that goal, we continued previous works from the authors in which it
is shown that any fixation pattern in a finite population can be realised by a Wright-Fisher
(WF) model. More precisely, it was shown in (Chalub and Souza, 2017) that given a N +1
vector F with F0 = 0, FN = 1 and 0 < Fi < 1, for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, then there exists a
choice of Type Selection Probabilities (TSPs) for which the corresponding WF model has
exactly F as its fixation vector.
One clear limitation of the present work, that deserves further investigation, is that we
did not study the large population limit of games, when N → ∞. From the numerical
experiments, we gathered evidence that certain fixation patterns can be reproduced by
game with a finite number of players, even if the population is infinite, whereas other
patterns will require a number of players that increases along with population size.
We finish by noticing that EGT has become pervasive in multiple applications — no-
tably in the mathematical study of biological and social evolution. However, EGT classical
framework is infinite, deterministic, and well mixed populations. This work shows how it
can be extended to describe the dynamics of finite populations with demographic noise
— although still well mixed and fixed size populations. Further development is possible
along many avenues: including structure, adding heterogeneity, or even moving towards
individual based models. Certainly, EGT has still a lot to offer.
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